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THE EVOLUTION OF CAUSA IN THE CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATIONS OF THE CIVIL LAW 
BY 
SAMUEL PETERSON, Ph. D., D. C. L. 
Adjunct Professor of Political Science, The University of Te.lUU!. 
In the modern Civil law a causa or cause is generally recognized as an 
•essential element in every contractual obligation. It is the purpose of 
this essay to trace the development of this principle from its origin in 
the Roman law to the present time, indicating its nature and aEIJlica-
tion throughout the varying and progressive course of jurisprudence. 
In the early Roman law the term causa was not used in connection 
with contracts or obligations in any juristic sense. Generalizations are 
.beyond the primitiye intellect; its notions are simple and separate, and 
every right, every legal duty and relation, is adopted specifically. When 
the conception of a contractual obligation first appears there is no 
-r~oognition of general characteristics common to all such obligations 
as known to us; even consent is quite disregarded, and, a fortiori, there 
remains unrecognized any merely rational ground for the enforcement 
:of an obligation, such as gain or loss to either party, or a natural desire 
,of the one to benefit the other. The attention is directed chiefly to the 
contract, which is more material than the obligation it contains ; and 
in the formation of the contract there is required something more im-
pressive than economic or social considerations; some striking formal 
act is demanded, and this alone is recognized, or, at least, is alone 
:recognized as essential. 
We therefore find in the Roman law that the earliest contract, the 
nexum, was most rigidly formal; the presence of the libripens and five 
witnesses, the acts done per aes et libram, and the technical dare damnas 
esto, uttered by the lender against the borrower-these were the essen-
tial elements in the formation of the contract and the creation of the 
obligation. And, as the system of obligations gradualfy broadened, each 
step consisted in admitting, as forming a contract, acts or relations of 
a particular kind. The mutuum thus aroEe from the nexum after the 
lex Vallia had deprived the latter of its binding force over the penon 
'Of the debtor. 
On the basis of the ancient mancipatio, which was a most formtil 
·trllllsfer ·of property per aes et libram, there was developed the manci-
·patio fiduciae causa, a form of contract applicable, so far as regards its 
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nature, to all cases involving a delivery of goods which were later to 
be restored. As the industrial activities of the people increased, the 
peculiar, time-wasting formalities of the fiducia were discarded, and in 
its place appeared the commodatum, depositum and pignus. 
Thus from the nexum and the mancipatio fiduciae causa arose the 
nominate real contracts, each with its restricted sphere and definite 
marks of identity, the only general characteristic recognized being the 
delivery of a res. Though in the mutuum and commodatum there· was 
present a decided advantage to the recipient, the principal obligor, this 
was quite indifferent in their legal aspect, since they were classified as 
correlative with the pignus, where the benefits were mutual, and the 
depositum, where accruing only to the depositor. 
The stipulatio, arising from the ancient religious sponsio, was also 
formal, the essential requirements consisting of a question and an answei: 
corresponding thereto; it required no mention of any economic or other 
rational ground in its formation, and, in its early history, was unaffected 
by the absence, failure or insufficiency of any such considerations. 
The same is true of the literal contract, consisting in th~ nomen 
transscripticium, or entry of a debt, with_ the assent of the debtor, in 
the creditor's codex accepti et expensi. Usually some sensible transac-
tion lay behind these entries, but this was a matl:E!r of indifference to 
the law; let the formal requirements be fulfilled, and there was an 
enforceable obligation, whatever else might be lacking. 
In the consensual contracts, which were of later recognition, the bare 
mutual agreement was sufficient, without artificial forms or performance 
by one of the parties. Here we seem to have the universal modern idea 
of a contract, but Roman jurisprudence limited this class to four of the 
most common kinds of business transactions: emptio venditio, locatio 
conductio, societas and mandatum; and never, during the existence of 
the empire, were any other agreements admitted. Thus it stopped far 
short of any general idea of contract as based on the consent of the 
parties. Moreover, though in three of these contracts mutuality was 
demanded by their very nature, the presence of the fourth proves that 
this was not recognized as a controlling element; such recognition would 
also have logically resulted in the inclusion of other mutual agreements; 
such as exchange, which contains virtually the same elements as sale. 
But the law continued in its long-accustomed method of expanding the 
system of contracts by adopting specific kinds by their particular aarnes-
not by recognizing certain elements as common to all. 
The development of this contract system was completed before the 
close of the Republic. Thus far there was no mention of causa as a 
necessary ingredient in any contract, and still less so regarding con-
tracts in general. Considering the mode of· development, there was 
little need of such a principle; each contract had its own peculiar 
features, and these were far more perspicuous and more easily applied 
as a test than an idea suah as causa, which has exercised, often without 
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satisfactory results, the analytic power of nineteenth century ju,rists. 
Moreover, causa is directly related only to the obligation a contract con-
tains, not to the contract itself. 
It is true that modern treatises on Roman law apply the term causa 
civilis to the res, verba, litterae and consensus upon which the classes 
of the above contract system are based ;1 but such a technical term was 
quite foreign to Roman jurists. 2 In the Corpus Juris we find but one 
instance of causa civilis being employed: in Dig. 15, 1, 49, 2, Pom-
ponius says: "Ut debitor vel servus domino vel dominus servo intelle-
gatur, ex causa civili computandum est;" here there is no technical use 
of the term,3 for he continues, by way of illustration: "ideoque si 
dominus in rationes suas referat se debere servo suo, cum omnino neque 
mutuum acceperit neque ulla causa praecesserat debendi, nuda ratio 
non facit eum debitorem ;" thus by causa civilis is merely meant such 
a ground as would bind a free man both by the Civil law and by natural 
reason.• 
The word causa in Roman law as well as in the Latin language was 
one of common use and varied signification. Its primary meaning was 
that of cause, ground, reason, etc., but its derived meanings gradually 
passed from the nearer to the more remote. In many instances its sig-
nification is indefinite, not rigidly controlled by the context, and 
allowing more or less different interpretation; and the difficulty of pre-
cision is increased by the fact that, though some of its meanings are 
clearly distinct, others gradually coalesce.5 
In the Corpus Juris we find as causae of obligations contractus and 
delicta, together with the peculiar facts quasi ex contractu and quasi 
ex delicto, which were grouped as variae causarum figurae. 6 Causa is 
here employed in its ordinary sense of cause, these juristic relations 
being viewed as faits generateurs d'obligations.7 No analysis of an· 
1 Hugo, Civilistische Magazin, I, 191, note. 
2Accarias, Preecis de droit romain ( 4. ed.), II , 16, note. He critiGises severely 
the common usage of this term, saying: "Pour qui n'a pas de parti pris, ou elle 
ne signifie rien, ou elle dlisigne un liJliment de crfation legaJe. En ce sens, fl y 
a certainement une causa civilis dans Jes contrats verbis et litteris, * • * 
mais dans Jes contrats rrels ou consensueJs on ne peut plus dlicouvrir aucune 
causa civilis, puisque Jes conditions qu'ils supposent dlirivent toutes de la nature 
des choses." 
• Idem: "Si la th~orie de la causa civilis est fausse comme thoorie glinlirale, 
!'expression elle-rnl\me, dans le sens que Jes interprl'!tes ont voulu Jui donner ici, 
n'est pas non plus romaine." Cf. Hugo's Lehrbuch eines civilistischen Cursus, 
III, 281; and Maynz, Cours de droit romain, II, 191, note. 
'Glossa: "Ex qua causa liber homo obligatur civiliter et naturali ter, ex eadem 
causa servus obligatur naturaliter tantum." 
• Brissonius, De verborum significatione, enumerates thirteen different mean-
ings of causa, Dirksen's Manuale gives eleven, and Heumann's Handleankon has 
eight, some of them with extended subdivisions. 
•Dig. 44, 7, 1, pr. 
' Ruben de Couder, R esume de droit romain, 36!). 
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in<li:vidual obligation was involved, no attempt to discover the element; 
esse:l:itial to its validity: it was merely a general observat~_on regarding 
the manner in which obligations arose. In this sense it is the cause 
efficiente of French jurists, having no historical or logical relation to 
the cause of an obligation, as recognized in the Code Civil. It is not 
technical, and may therefore be applied freely _to the contract ~s well 
as to the obligation, signifying then the res, verba, litterae and con-
sensus by which contracts are created.8 It is thus that ca.usa civilis is 
used by modern writers. 
For purposes of treatment it will be of advantage to here distinguish 
between a contract and an obligation, assuming a philosophical rather 
than a legal point of view. A contract then appears to be a purely legal 
concept, having no existence without the sanction of law. Obligations, 
however, may be termed either natural or legal, a natural obligation 
being one justified by natura!is ratio, a legal obligation, one enforceable 
by the machinery of the law. It is evident that an obligation may be 
either merely natural, or merely legal, or both simultaneously.9 With 
an obligation that is merely natural we have nothing to do, it having 
no juristic existence. Those which are merely legal are treated only 
by way of distinction, since, having no naturalis ratio, they have no 
causa, relying upon the contractual form, the causa civilis, for their 
validity. Only with those which are both natural and legal are we 
directly concerned, causa being some fact, forming a naturalis ratio, to 
which fact the law has given juristic force as an essential element in 
contractual obligations. 
Returning to the contracts above enumerated, one can point out in 
each the causae of their obligations; but it must be remembered that 
the Romans did so specifically only in exceptional cases, to be hereafter 
·set forth; though the presence of these considerations influenced their 
reasoning, they were seldom differentiated and generalized, and denom-
inated causae. These causae consist generally in a dare or facere, in 
something objective and easy of apprehension, and also capable of eco-
nomic estimation-something having a natural existence developed di-
rectly by the industrial needs of the people quite independently of law. 
Thus, in the real contracts the causa of the obligation of the recipient 
was in the delivery of the thing, the res.10 
In the verbal and literal contracts the causa was not necessarilv vis-
ible.11 But it was none the less usually present, and finally, with the 
• "Une causa, c'est-1\.-dire un fait g<'\n<'\rateur, comme la tradition, les paroles 
solennelfes, l'<'\criture, et quelquefois le simple consentement." de Fresquet, Traite 
eliimentaire, 206. 
•Cf. Savigny, Obligationenrecht, I, §5. 
,. The causa of one of the two obligations in the contract thus coincided with 
the latter's so-called causa civilis. 
" "Ein abstracter Vertrag kann nach Ri'imischem Recht die Stipulation sein; 
zwar ist sie geeignet, auch den Zweck ( causa stipuiationis) in sich aufzunehmen 
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increasing influence of the jus gentium, became of decisive importance. 
These contracts were originally of such strict formal validity that the 
bare form was sufficient to make them absolutely enforceable (provided, 
of course, the parties were of full capacity); but in course of time the 
praetor began to look behind the form ( causa civilis) to the transaction, 
and, in case of action upon a stipulatio where there was no natural 
obligation, no dare or facere, no causa, to grant an exceptio doli mali. 
It is in this cDnnection that we meet with one of the origins of the term 
causa as herein employed. In Dig. 44, 4, 2, 3, Ulpian says : "Si quis 
sine causa ab aliquo fuerit stipulatus, deinde ex ea stipulatione ex-
periatur exceptio utique doli mali ei nocebit. * * * Et si certa 
fuit causa stipulationis, quae tamen aut non e!'t secuta, aut finita est, 
dicendum erit nocere exceptionem." 
Considering the sense in which causa is here used, it appears that, 
although in the first instance it may be understood merely as reason or 
cause, the second requires a more material signification, adding that of 
res to that of reason or cause. Though scarcely technical because of the 
latitude with which causa is employed in this fragment, taken as a 
whole, still, from the manner of employment in the instances cited, 
there seems to be the beginning of a technical application; and this is 
strengthened in a related passage, also by Ulpian, Dig. 39, 5, 19, 5: 
"Sed et hae stipulationes quae ob causam fiunt, non habent donationem." 
These passages suggest that, in treating of the validity of stipulation.-1 
after they became influenced by the jus gentium, there was needed a 
general term combining the sense of a reason with the signification of 
an act or thing which itself might be a reason, and that causa was 
adopted as best satisfying these requirements. 
Here, then, we have one of the origins of causa in the sense in which 
it is found in the modern Civil law on obligations.12 Being of such wide 
range as regards adaptability, with essentially the same meaning causa 
could easily have had several points of introduction in different parti 
of the contract system; and though no direct connection may be traced 
between its use in connection with the stipulatio and its later develop-
ment, yet we may asi::ume that its use there influenced its contempora-
neous use in the innominate real contracts, which is clearly the antece-
dent of the modern doctrine of cause. 
Continuing now the investigation into the causae of the obligations 
( z. B. dotis nomine tot dari spondes? spondeo) , allein hiiufig wird sie als 
abstracter Vertrag abgeschlossen (centum dare spondes? spondeo)." Baron, 
Pandekten, §214. 
"Code civil, arts. l108, ll3l·ll33. Artur, JJ:tude sur la cause, 120. However, 
though its sense be quite the same, its position in the contract system of the 
Code Civil is radically different from its use in the above passages: in the for-
mer it is an essential element for the existence of a contraet, in the latter the 
stipulatio exists validly without it, but its absence is a good defenRe in case 
of suit. 
(36) 
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found in Roman contracts, we come to the class of contracts known as 
consensual. These are all fully bilateral (or synallagmatic), having 
two obligations, while the verbal and literal contracts have only one, and 
in the real, one is far more important ·than the other. As we have seen, 
the consensus is called the causa civilis of a consensual contract. As to 
the causae of the obligations, they are to be found in the reciprocal 
promises, viewed in connection with the things promised: thus in 
emptio venditio the seller binds himself to transfer the property in the 
object because the buyer promises to pay a certain sum therefor; and 
the buyer binds himself to pay the price because the seller promises to 
make him the owner of that object; 18 the legally sufficient reason for the 
promise of the one is the promise of the other, each promise being taken 
in. connection with what is promised: the bare promise, without the ex-
istence of the object and the possibility of its subjection to the power 
of the promisor, is no juristic act; so also, the object itself, without any 
promise of its transfer, can not enter into the law of obligations. To be 
causae of obligations in the consensual contracts, there must be a 
practical and economic sense to the promises. · 
Considering the consensual contracts as a class it appears that three, 
emptio venditio, locatio conductio and societas, by their very nature 
required reciprocity in the obligations, that is, each obligation had its 
causa. But the theoretical insignificance of this fact is shown by the 
remaining contract, mandatum, which, also by a radical necessity, was 
gratuitous. Moreover, the term causa was never thus applied to the 
obligations of the ·consensual contracts in Roman law; nor was there 
need of it: in treating of sale, for example, it was sufficient to speak of 
the object sold and the purchase price.14 
Of the contracts in Roman law there remain to be discussed only those 
ealled by modern writers innominate real. These were of later recogni-
tion than the nominate real contracts (mutuum, commodatum, deposi-
tum and pignus), and were stated under the general formulae •of do ut 
des, do ut facias, facio ut des, facio ut faciru;. They quite coincide with 
exchange, in its widest untechnical sense, including services and acts as 
well as commodities. By nature they were consensual and bilateral, like 
emptio venditio and locatio conductio; but in them the bare consensus 
"'We expressly avoid the view of causa as the purpose the promisor has in 
mind in making the promise. Baron, illustrating causa obligationis as Zweck, 
says: "Der Kliufer verspricht dem · Verkliufer eine Geldsumme, damit der Ver-
kliufer ihm verspreche, ihm einen gewissen Gegenstand in das . Vermogen zu 
ttbertragen ;" (P<11ndekten, §348, I .) and Laborde speaks of cause as "le but 
immMiat et apparent, que se propose la partie qui s'oblige." (TMorie de la 
cause, 7.) But it is not this purpose which forms the basis of his obligation, 
the naturalis ratio why he should be bound; the law does not enforce the promise 
of the buyer because in promising he purposed obtaining a certain object. 
14 In the Code civil there is no mention of cause in the title on Vente; art. 
1583 reads: "Elle est parfaite entre les parties, et la proprit!M est acquise de 
droit a l'acheteur a l't!gard du vendeur, d~s qu'on est convenu de la chose et du 
prix." 
(37) 
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was never held sufficient to produce any legal effect. To create an ob-
ligation there had to be performance by one of the parties; this baving-
occurred there was recognized during the Republic an obligation quasi 
ex contractu, entitling the party performing to a return of whatever 
gain bad passed to the other. Later, during the Empire, such perform-
ance was given the effect of creating a contractus, so that the party per-
forming could demand of the other the performance of what this one 
had promised. 
The contract itself was thus unilateral rather than bilateral; though 
there were two natural obligations in the agreement, one of these had to 
be fulfilled in order to bring the contract into existence, leaving only 
one natural obligation to become the legal obligation of the contract; 
though each of the natural obligations had a causa, the one being the 
causa of the other, this was wholly disregarded. But viewing the legal 
obligation which is created, it is evident that, quite apart from the orig-
inal agreement, it forms also a natural obligation, the causa of which 
consists in the performance of the obligee.15 
This performance, then, had two aspects: viewed as the causa civilis 
of the contract it was called res, and hence, as regards classification, 
these contracts were assimilated to the real; on the other hand, viewed a.a 
the basis of the obligation, as a reason for its existence, the performance 
was called causa. Thus, in Dig. 2, 14, 7, 2, Ulpian says: "Sed et si in 
alium contractum res non transeat, subsit tamen causa, eleganter Arista 
Celso respondit esse obligationem; ut puta dedi tibi rem ut mihi aliam 
dares, dedi ut aliquid facias: hoc synallagma [ contractus] esse, et hinc 
nasci civilem obligationem." But this distinction was by no means 
rigid or technical, and res and causa were often used interchangeably. 
The point of chief importance is that causa was employed to represent 
the dare or facere in these transactions, this dare or facere being viewed 
as having some juristic effect. The circumstance that this effect might 
be a contract was quite accidental; causa was not considered as peculiar 
to contractual obligations. This is clearly revealed in the remedies de-
veloped for these transactiorni: in demanding counter-performance, suing, 
of course, upon the contractus, the complainant used the actio prae-
scriptis verbis, wherein no mention was made of causa; while in seek-
ing to recover his res, consequently rejecting the idea of a contract and 
relying upon the obligation quasi ex contractu, his remedy was by the 
condictio causa data causa non secuta.16 Causa was merely employed 
as a convenient general term signifying some fact upon which depended. 
,. Pufendorf says of these contracts: "Elles sont fond~es sur quelque cause, 
c'est-ll.-dire, sur ce que l'un des contractans a donn~ ou fait actuellement que.lque 
chose, afin que l'autre ex~cuta.t a. son tour ce ll. quoi il s'est engag~ en sa faveur." 
Le Droit de la nature et des gens, Bk. V, ch. II, §2. 
••Dig. 12, 4. GI ii ck, Pandekten, XIII, 10. The glossa remarks: "Causa 
nihil aliud est hie quam res, cujus intuitu datur aliq.uid, puta, aut invicem des 
vel facias aliquid." This condictio is sometimes called ob rem dati. 
(38) 
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an obligatory relation, without regard to whether the obligation W:WJ. 
contractual or not.17 
It wag only in a later age, long after the vicissitudes of time had. 
swept away the formal contract system of the Roman law, that jurist.a, 
inspired with the genius of Roman jurisprudence in the law of obliga-
tions, should select this undeveloped principle of causa, and make it a 
universal element in every contractual obligation. This was impossible 
for the Romans; their formal system was rooted deep in their national 
history and development; though modified by the jus gen ti um, and 
though the jus gentium reached full application in the consensual and 
nominate real contracts, yet an aspect of . formalism was given even 
these by denying contractual force to agreements in general by rigidly 
classifying those admitted and pointing out the distinctive marks of 
each. In such a system there was not only no need of a recognition of 
causa as known to modern jurists, but it was inadmissible as such. It 
could be used in a certain class as a general term for the dare or facere-
upon which an obligation was based, but its recognition as a technical . 
term, indicating an element essential to every contractual obligation, 
would have demoralized the entire contract system. Law is one of the 
products constantly issuing from the social organism, and especially is 
the law of obligations rooted in the character and customs of the people. 
A radical social as well as political revolution was therefore necessary 
to eliminate the formal and peculiar elements, leaving conditions favo.r-
able to the recognition of the essential and universal. 
These conditions, as regards Western Europe,18 were brought abo.ut 
by the submergence and transmutation of Roman institutions in conse-
quence of the invasions by the barbarians. These being on a lower stage 
of civilization, their conquests brought about simpler social conditions, a 
simpler sys.tern of commercial and industrial relations, demanding cor-
respondingly simpler rules of law. They found the Roman law upon 
their arrival, but were unable to maintain it at the point it had reached, 
still less to advance it to a higher point. And this was due not alone to 
the shortcomings of the conquerors, but largely also to the state of the 
Roman law at that time.. Scattered throughout an indefinite number 
of volumes, of varying authority, and itself interwoven with technical-
ities and intricacies of procedure belonging to a period seYeral centuries. 
17 This observation is emphasiz.ed if we examine the other condictiones sine 
causa, all being given for obligations which were quasi ex contractu, and some 
excluding even the presence of an agreement. See Baron, Pandekten, §§281-285. 
"As to the Eastern Empire it need only be said that it suffered from inter-
nal decay, resulting in a cessation of legal progress after the reign of Justinian; 
in time there began a retrogression, which continued through many centuries, 
gradually simplifying the highly developed system of Justinian, until a very low 
standard had been reached. This retrogression is indicated by the successive 
abridgments of the Corpus Juris, forming a descending series until the Heu-
biblos of Harmenopulos was reached in 1345, "ein klliglicher Auszug aus den 
Ausziigen der Ausziige." Holtz.endorff, Encyclopiidie der Rechts wissen8chaft (5. 
ed ., ) 1, 174. 
(39) 
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earlier, there was required, for its proper understanding, a high degree 
of knowledge and special training even among the Romans. Moreover, 
the emperors had long been the agency of all legal progress, and western 
Europe was now withdrawn from their authority. Besides, the imperial 
development of the law of obligations had ever been slight, and the doc-
trine of causa had made no perceptible advance since the great jurists of 
the third century. 
From the fall of Rome until after the eleventh century the social or-
ganization throughout western Europe .remained simple, especially as 
regards business relations, and consequently there was no demand for a 
complex law of obligations. During these centuries there was going on 
a coalescence of rules derived from the Roman law with the legal institu-
tions of the Germarn:, forming a new law as well of obligations as of 
property, persons, etc. But the Roman elements were chiefly of the. 
more positive, practical kind, and the doctrine of causa, which had only 
begun to form dim outlines during the culminating period of Roman 
jurisprudence, remained wholly unaffected. It was compelled to wait 
until a time should come when the loftiest achievements of Rome's 
greatest jurists, as preserved in J ustinian~s Digest, could be understood 
and appreciated. · 
The importance to our subject of these intermediate centuries is of 
a different nature from that of the centuries preceding and following; 
it consists in two leading considerations: first, that during them the 
social connections with the Roman state were swept away, or radically 
transformed, so that the formal contract system of Rome could never be 
re-established; secondly, that they brought about simpler social condi-
tions, so that later, when business relations rapidly began to grow more 
complex, the current system of contract law was simple, thus facilitat-
ing the introduction of theories and principles derived from the Corpus 
Juris. 
The codification of Justinian, being executed long after the Western 
Empire had fallen, reached only the parts of Italy temporarily recon-
quered by Justinian himself. Though it remained in use and was 
studied, at least in Home, throughout the succeeding centuries, this ap-
pears to have been true chiefly of the Institutes and Novels, the Digest 
in particular being neglected. Hence the knowledge of Roman law as 
a system of jurisprudence did not exist. It was not until the second 
half of the eleventh century, and then only at Bologna, that the Digest 
began to be thoroughly studied and appreciated. In northern Italy 
had grown up schools' teaching the law as found in the edicts and capitu-
laries of the Lombard and I<rankish kings, and a method of treatment 
by writing glossae on the text had been developed in dealing with this 
material. But at this period the great commercial cities of northern 
Italy began to outgrow the legal system derived from the centuries pre-
ceding: the increasing complexity of their business relations and indus-
trial conditions demanded a more highly-developed system; and thus it 
(40) 
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was that the schools of law took up the study of Justinian's Corpus 
Juris, including the Digest; this supplied a fund of legal rules and 
principles, which, properly treated, satisfied every demand.19 
This demand was directed especially towards the law of obligations, 
whose principles are, moreover, capable of more general application than 
those of other departments of la;v. The rules concerning property and 
persons are far more dependent upon peculiarities in the form of govern-
ment than those concerning obligations. 20 Thus it happened that in 
the Corpus Juris the matters pertaining to obligations were best under-
stood and most generally applied . But in the Roman law of obliga-
tions it is necessary to distinguish between that which is founded in the 
very nature of human relations, and that which is due to formal peculiar-
ities or to accidental phenomena in the development of legal institu-
tions: the former is essential and permanent, the latter, incidental, and 
disappears from the applied law with the conditions upon which it is 
dependent. Consequently, though the study of the Corpus Juris em-
braced both these elements, the application to actual' cases had to be 
restricted to the former. 
The school at Bologna first, . and later those elsewhere, taking up the 
Corpus Juris, applied to it the method already developed-that of 
making glossae on the text. This was a prerequisite tp its practical 
understanding and. use, and also to the extraction and further develop-
ment of the various legal principles and theories it contained. The 
glossators purpose only to explain, and their method being such that it 
dealt with material in a fragmentary manner, it is evident that much 
advance in the de..velopment of general doctrines was impossible; hence, 
as regards causa, no noteworthy progress was made in the doctrine itself. 
However, the glossators helped prepare the way for this doctrinal devel-
opment, making the text more distinct, and also adding somewhat in 
ideas, for, as was quite inevitable, in explaining they also construed 
more or less. 
It was in the thirteenth century, when the glossators were completing 
their work, that the Corpus Juris began to exert its irresistible influence 
upon the current, customary systems of law. There began to appear 
treatises professing to set forth this law. These were largely based upon 
the Corpus Juris, especially as regards obligations, an.d some were little 
more than paraphrases of selected titles from the Institutes and Digest. 
By reason of this artificial introduction, the writers varying in degree of 
reliability, and all without official authority, there ensued a long period 
of confusion aµd uncertainty,21 increased by the peculiar political con-
" Savigny, Geschichte des romischen Rech ts (2. ed.), III, 84 . 
.. The English Common Law is far more nearly like the Continental in thE 
matter of obligations than in any other department. The fact that it has been 
influenced by the Roman law chiefly in this department of itself reveals thE 
innate universality of this branch of law, especially as compared with those oi 
persons and property. · 
21 Glasson, Droit et institutions de la Fra.nce, VII, 595. 
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ditions and the local nature of all private laws. One principle, how-
ever, was positively accepted by all: conventio legem vincit, otherwise 
emphasized as pacta sunt servanda. Thenceforth it was established 
that the formal contract system of Rome, with its so-called causa civilis, 
had passed away, never to be re-adopted. 
· In stating, however, that as a general rule all agreements were action-
able, it was necessary to understand thereby only such as were intended 
to have, or would be recognized as having, some juristic effect.22 In 
carrying out this understanding some of the foremost writers virtually 
began the modern development of the doctrine of causa, though without 
making definite, technical use of the term itself. They had not yet 
reached the point of comprehensive generalization, which remained for 
a much later century. They discussed limited classes of facts, or even 
individual cases, and therefore did not need so general a term as causa. 
Beaumanoir (about 1275) appears to have more nearly approached 
it1:1 adoption than any other writer for several centuries. He treats quite 
comprehensively of convenences which are contre droit and contre bones 
meurs and in one instance even speaks of them collectively as les conve-
nences qui sont fetes par malveses causes,-conventions which would 
now be clearly recognized as having a cause illicite. 23 As to the agree-
ments which would now be considered sans cause there is far less pre-
cision, conditiom precedent to the formation of a contract being con-
fused with its elements of validity or enforceability.24 Other writers 
of Coutumiers also generalized more or less regarding the essentials of 
11 contractual obligation, but none approached the comprehensive mod-
ern view; indeed, this was scarcely possible in view of the diversified 
formalism, coming out from the centuries preceding (being of Ger-
manic, late Roman, and Canonical origin), and persisting in various 
parts of the law of contracts: e. g. the provisions for an oath. 25 or the re-
quirement of a writing. 
22 
"Handlung, deren Absicht auf eine rechtliche Wirkung gerichtet ist." Puchta, 
lnstitutionen, II, 342. 
• Beaumanoir, Ooutumes du Beauvoisis, ch. 34, §§2, 23, 24, and cf. 25. Also, 
in ch. 35, §22, treating of the validity of "lettres" containing an obligation, he 
eays: "Le letre qui dist que je doi deniers et ne fet pas mention de quoi je Jes 
doi, est souspechonneuse coze de malice; et quant tele letre vient en cort, si doit 
eavoir Ii juge le coze dont tele dete vint, avant qu'il le face paier." 
••Glasson (Droit et institutions de la France, VII, 602) is evidently in error 
when he says of Beaumanoir: "Ce jurisconsulte fa it tr~s clairement remarquer 
que dans Jes contrats synallagmatiques, !'obligation de l'un est la cause de !'ob-
ligation de l'autre." The instance selected in support of this assertion and 
etated thus : "En cas d'echange, celui qui a r ec;u la chose d'autrui et qui a livr~ 
la sienne propre peut reclamer ou la chose promise ou la restitution de ce qu'il 
a donn!!"-merely shows Beaumanoir to have repeated the Roman law on innomi-
11.ate real contracts. 
"'"Le droit canonique avait fait du serment promissoi re un veritable contrat 
formaliste qui se r!!pandit tr~s rapidement 1l raison de !'esprit religieux du temps. 
En l'organisant ainsi, ii s'etait inspire 1l la fois du droit romain et de la fl.dee 
Jacta germanique." Glasson, Droit et institutions de la France, VlI , 684. 
(42) 
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Returning to the pure Roman law we find, succeeding the glossators 
in the work upon the Corpus Juris, the commentators. These departed 
from the exegetic method of the former; instead of concise elucidations 
they wrote long treatises on the text, examining it exhaustively, and 
tracing the application of rules into minute details. No direct progress 
appears to have been made in the development of general doctrines, such 
as causa: for, employing the deductive method, and being under the 
scholastic influence of the period, they analyzed without corresponding 
synthesis, made subtle distinctions without comprehensive generalization. 
It was not until the sixteenth century that the synthetic process began; 
then, turning away from scholasticism, jurists sought to understand 
Roman law as a whole, as a system of jurisprudence, with interrelated 
principles of general application. Here is the beginning of the modem 
scientific cle>elopment of Roman law. 
Simultaneously with this study of the Corpus Juris went the continued 
development of the current law. This development continued to be 
chiefly based upon principles deri.-ed from the Roman law, but during 
the seventeenth century a new factor was introduced: the philosophy 
of natural law was employed to modify and work these principles into 
harmony with the highest juristic ideals of the age. This was espe-
cially true of France; in Germany there was a more literal adherence t.o 
the Corpus Juris, efforts being directed towards adjusting it to existing 
conditiom, while in France tte striving was towards a perfect, philo-
sophical sy"tem of law, founded on natural reason. These respective 
tendencies were encouraged by local circumstances, such as differences 
in the state of the current law; and the divergence increased through-
out the eip:hteenth and nineteenth centuries. Consequently the further 
development of the theory of causa divided into two well-defined 
branches, which we may call the French and the German, each requiring 
::c~parate treatment. 
First taking up France as having wrought the theory of causa more 
naturally and perfectly into her native jurisprudence, we find, already 
· in the latter part of the s~>enteenth century, the decisive statement of 
ifleas which ultimately led to the imertion in the Code Civil of cause 
as one of the "quatre condition" essentielles pour la validite 
d'une convention." 26 Domat, in his Lois Cii-iles dans leur Ordre Nat-
·urel, though merely claiming "to undertake tee digesting of the Roman 
laws into their true and natural order, hoping thereby to render the 
"tucly of them more easy, more useful. and more agreeable," 27 in fact 
11<'veloped a modern Eystem, based on natural reason, the Corpus Juris 
!wing uFecl chiefly by way of suggestion. Though his terminology was 
la rgely that of Roman law, and though the Corpus Juris was cited on 
11 :~arly eYery article, yet this was only the formal exterior, beneath which 
!ny the mo~:t radical departure from Roman principles of classification 
" Oocle ci.-i:il, art . ll 08. 
"' Author's Preface, in Translation by William Strahan. 
(43) 
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'&nd treatment.28 Moreover, at that time there was no natioual juris-
prudence: each district had its own customs and laws, differing vari-
ously from those of other districts, and the treatises on these current 
systems were chiefly local Coutumiers. It was Domat's work, penP.-
trating beneath these in analysis and rising beyond them in generaliia-
tion, that led the way to the uniform national jurisprudence of the 
nineteenth century. 
In his treatment of obligations Domat, avoiding the terms contrat or 
pacte because of their restricted signification in the Roman law, adopts 
that of convention,29 and with its assistance develops a contractual sys-
tem on the broadest desirable basis. Then, beginning his classification, 
he says: "Les communications et les commerces pour !'usage des 
personnes et celui des choses sont de quatre sortes, qui font quatre 
especes de conventions. Car ceux qui traitent ensemble ou se donnent 
reciproquement une chose pour une autre, comme dans un vente ou dans 
un echange; ou font quelque chose l'un pour l'autre, comme s'ils se 
chargent de l'affaire l'un de l'autre; ou bien l'un fait et l'al1tre donne, 
oomme lorsqu'un mercenaire donne son travail pour un certain prix; 
ou bien enfin, un seul fait ou donne, l'autre ne faisant ou ne donnant 
rien, comme lorsqu'une personne se charge gratuitement <le l'affoire 
d'une autre, ou que l'on fait une donation par pure liberalite." 30 
The first three classes are evidently suggested by the innominate real 
contracts of the Roman law, the first being do ut des, the second, facio 
ut des or do ut facias, the third, facio ut facias; but the basis of classi-
fication is radically different. In the first place, by ranging sale with 
exchange as a do ut des, he clearly rejects the Roman formal system, 
constructing a new one based on natural characteristics. But still more 
fruitful is the observation that to him there is no distinction between 
facio ut des and do ut facias: taking the agreement as the basis of the 
contract, the two elements of doing and giving appear simultaneously 
as promises, a.nd these two formulae become equivalents the one of the 
other; while in Roman law, where performance was the basis of the 
contract, the one had to precede. This difference is further revealed 
in the succeeding article: "Dans ces trois premieres sortes de conven-
tions, il se fait un commerce ou rien n'est gratuit, et !'engagement de 
l'un est le fondement de celui de l'autre." Thus he makes the engage-
""'La ten<lance la plus rnarqure des jurisconsultes du XVIIe et du XVIIIe 
sil!cles * * * est la generalisation et, par suite, la formation d'un droit 
eomrnun. Dornat, par Ia nature de son esprit, devait suivre ce courant qui 
·eonduira a. la codification du XIXe sil!cle; rnais il cherche moins a. degager ce 
droit cornmun des pratiques couturnil!res les plus repandues dans notre pays que 
d'un di:oit ideal qu'il puise dans les prrecptes evangeliques et surtout dans Jes 
lois romaines." Tardif, Histoire des sources du droit fran~ais, 494. 
"'Dig. 2, 14, I, 3: "Conventionis verbum generale est ad omnia pertiuen8, d~ 
quibus negotii contrahen<li transigendique causa consentiunt qui inter se agunt." 
.. Domat, Lois ckilc.~, Liv. I , Tit. I, §1 , art. 4. 
(44) 
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ment (not the performance) of the one the basis of the obligation of 
the other. 
Having discarded the Roman contractual system and its tests of valid-
ity, it became necessary to adopt some other test; this had to be founded 
in natural reason, hence going to the obligation rather than the contract, 
and had to be of universal application. The germ of such a principle 
was found in the Roman causa as employed in the innominate real con-
tracts. We have the principle already suggested above; continuing the 
quotation we reach the term itself: "Dans Jes conventions memes, ou 
un seul para!t oblige, comme dans le pret d'argent, l'obligation de 
celui qui emprunte a ete precedee de la part de l'autre de ce qu'il 
devait donner pour former la convention. Ainsi, !'obligation qui se 
forme dans ces sortes de conventions, au profit [a la charge J de l'un 
des contractants, a toujours sa cause de la part de l'autre: et l'obligation 
serait nulle, si dans la verite elle etait sans cause." 
As regards meaning it appears that cause here embraces all the 
sense of the corresponding causa in the Roman law, and further, that 
it is more differentiated, having more of technical force. The latter 
observation is emphasized in the author's treatment of the fourth class 
above, "ou un seul fait ou donne et ou l'autre ne fait et ne donne rien;' 
concerning which he says: "L'engagement de celui qui donne a son 
fondement rnr quelque motif raisonable et juste, comme un service rendu, 
OU quelqu'autre merite du donataire, OU le seul pla.isir de faire du bien. 
Et ce motif ticnt lieu de cause de la part de celui qui m;oit et ne 
donne rien." 31 
The doctrine of cause is further developed by Domat in discussing 
invalid or unenforceable conventions. He here sets forth the principles 
which were finally adopted into the Code Civil regarding obligations 
"sans cause, ou sur une fausse cause, ou sur une cause illicite." As to 
the first of these he says: "Dans les conventions ou quelque'un se 
trouve oblige sans aucune cause, l'obligation est nulle. Et il en est de 
meme, si la cause vient a cesser. Mais c'est par les circonstances qu'il 
faut juger si !'obligation a sa cause ou non." 32 Though making no 
use of the expression cause illicite, he states definitely the reasons for 
the nullity of conventions which are prohibited by law or are contrary 
to good morals.33 The passage just quoted emphasizes Domat's accept-
ance of the term cause with the same material sense with which it is 
employed in the Corpus Juris, that is, as a prestation, as something 
real and objective, and generally capable of economic estimation. It 
also emphasizes the position allotted to cause in the law of obligations, 
that it is an element upon which depends the existence of an obligation, 
not merely its enforceability, and that the obligation, not the contract, 
has a cause. · 
•
1 Domat, Lois civiles, Liv. I, Tit. I, §1, art. o. 
32 Idem, §5, art. 13. 
83 Idem, art. 6. 
(45) 
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The French jurists of the eighteenth century, following the method 
of Domat, wrote treatises on law as founded in natural reason, but 
ceased his artificial dependence upon the Corpus Juris; they recognized 
that there was growing up in France a native jurisprudence, which 
though tracing its historical sources chiefly to the Roman law, neverthe-
less had an independent existence and sanction. Among the writers of 
this century we need only consider Pothier,34 "le plus grande juris-
consulte du XVIIIe siecle," who made the chief and final advance in 
the law of obligations, as left by Domat, before the formation of the 
Code Civil. 
Domat had achieved the virtual separation from the Corpus Juris; 
Pothier completed the process by making the separation nominal or 
verbal as well.35 Though the doctrine of cause appears quite complete 
in Domat, there is evident in Pothier an increase in its positiveness, and 
in the technical force with which the term is employed. In his Traite 
des Obligations (1'161), on "Defaut de cause dans le contrat," he says: 
"Tout engagement doit avoir une cause honnete. Dans les contrats 
interesses, la cause de l'engagement que contracte l'une des parties, est 
ce que l'autre partie lui donne, ou s'engage de lui donner, ou le risque 
dont elle o;e r.harge. Dans les contrats ile bienfaisance, la liberalite que 
l'une des parties veut exercer envers l'autre, est une cause suffisante de 
l'engagement qu'elle contracte envers elle. Mais lorsqu'un engagement n'a 
aucune cause, ou, ce qui est la meme chose, lorsque la cause pour laquelle 
il a ete contracte est une came fausse, l'engagement est nul, et le con-
trat qui le renfermc est nul." 3 G The use of cause appears here as defi-
nite and unhesitating as if the principle had long been settled that every 
obligation (engagement) required this element for its existence. And 
inasmuch as this Traite was immediately acknowledged the leading 
authority, and has since remained a classic work, upon obligations, it fol-
lowed that thenceforth the doctrine of cause was firmly established in the 
jurisprudence of France. 
If we examine cause as employed in the above passage it appears to 
have a different meaning according as the contracts are a titre onereux 
( interesses) or a titre gratuit (de bienfaisance). In the former it is 
still a dare or facere, that is, some objective reality, allowing of economic 
estimation, and viewed in connection with some transaction for whose 
legal existence ' it forms a sufficient reason. And this is indirectly 
84 "Schon vor Pothier hat Prevot de la Jannl!s in seinen :Elernens de jurispru-
dence von diesern auf den Grund rnehrerer Parlarnentsentscheidungen nothwen-
digen Erfordernisse einer cause de ]'obligation gesprochen." Warnkoenig, Fran-
zlJsische Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte, II, 533. 
80 He says: "Dans notre droit on ne doit point definir le contrat, cornrne le 
definissent !es interprl!tes du droit rornain, Conventio nornen habens a jure civili, 
vel causam, mais on le doit definir, une convention par Iaquelle Jes deux parties 
rt'\ciproquement, ou seulement l'une des deux, promettent et s'engagent envers 
l'autre ll. Jui donner quelque chose, ou ll. faire ou ne pas faire quelque chose." 
1'raite des obligations, Part. I, ch. I, §l. 
,. Part. I, ch. I, §6. 
(46) 
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acknowledged to be still its more proper signification, for in the other 
elass of contracts, the gratuitous, cause is qualified by suffisante; in these 
it is no longer necessarily a prestation, but falls back upon the will 6£ the 
obligor. 
Pothier, continuing his discussion of cause, follows Domat in the 
latter's treatment of void conventions (but using contrat where Domat 
uses convention). Though in this connection the term cause was hardly 
employed by Domat, Pothier uses it in the most prominent and technical 
manner; he begins, "Lorsque la cause pour laquelle !'engagement a ete 
contracte, est une cause qui blesse la justice, la bonne foi, ou les bonnes 
moeurs, cet engagement est nnl, ainsi que le contrat qui le renferme ;" and 
further on the expression cause licite and cause illicite are freely used.37 
Pothier as well as Domat always employs cause in a clear manner., 
suggesting no doubt or confusion regarding its meaning or use. This 
is especially noticeable in that he generally avoids speaking of the cause 
of a contract or convention: as in Domat it is the cause of an obligation, 
so in Pothier, expressing the same idea, it is the cause of an engagement 
or promesse. 
Thus stood the doctrine of cause at the time of the formation of the 
Code Civil. This work was done hastily, the original draft being com-
pleted within four months. It was done, moreover, during a period in 
the midst of wars with other nations, and of radical political changes 
within. It was not a time for the thorough study and analysis cif legal 
principles, nor had there arisen since his death such a jurist as Pothier. 
Consequently it was quite inevitable that the editors of the Code should 
be controlled by the powerful reason and logic of the writings of this 
jurist, who had emancipated himself from the Roman law and had pur-
posed to write, and in fact had written, the law both as it was and as it 
ought to be.38 And so we find that nearly three-fourths of the Code 
Civil wnb derived from Pothier, and this chiefly in the matter of obli-
gations, where his classification and terminology as well as principles 
were largely adopted.39 
Article 1108 of the Code Civil reads as follows : "Quatre conditions 
sont essentielles pour la validite d'une convention: le consentement de 
la partie qui s'oblige; la capacite de contracter; un objet certain qui forme 
la matiere de l'engagement; une cause licite dans l'obiigation." It is 
noteworthy that here cause is placed in direct connection with the obli-
gation, as in Domat and Pothier, and this is emphasized in art. 1131, 
which states the effect of the absence of a cause licite, viz. : "L'obliga-
tion sans cause, ou sur une fausse cause, ou sur une cause illicite, ne 
peut avoir aucun effet ;" and to this is added, by way of explanation, 
87 Part. I, ch. I, §6. 
88 
"La qualite propre il cet eminent jurisconsulte, c'est une union parfaite de 
la thoorie et de la pratique." Grand dictionnaire universel, on Pothier. 
""Le Traite des obligations est passe presque textuellement duns notre Code 
Civil." Grand dictionnaire 11niversel, on Pothier. 
(47) 
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art. 1132, that "La convention n'est pas moins valable, quoique la caus0 
n'en soit pas exprimee ;" and art. 1133, "La cause est illicite, quand elle 
est prohibee par la loi, quand elle est contraire aux bonnes moeurs ou a 
l'ordre public." These are the only instances in which the term cause 
is thus employed in the Code. 
Considering now . the meaning of cause in these articles, it will be 
necessary first to distinguish between the contracts a titre onereux and 
those a titre gratuit. In the former the cause is always some quid pro quo 
furnished at the request of the obligor, usually by the obligee: in the 
bilateral contracts it consists in a promise to give or do something; in 
the unilateral, in something given or done. In the contracts a titre 
gratuit the cause is no longer a quid pro quo, but must be found in the 
will or desire of the obligor to benefit the obligee, such will or desire 
being taken in connection with the facts or circumstances upon which 
it is based and by which it is explai11ed. This is the view of cause pre-
sented by Domat and Pothier, and we may asrnme it to be the one 
adopted by the editors of the Code, especially since Bigot-Preameneu, 
in the Expose des Notifs, sa id on art. 1131: "Il n'y a.point d'obliga-
tion sans cause: elle est dans l'interet reciproque des parties ou dans la 
bienfaisance de l'une d'elles." 40 
This would seem to be the juristic termination of the question, and-1n 
practice there is no need of transcending these simple rules. But 
a.cademic discussion, penetrating into legal treatises, sought to de-
termine the real ultimate nature of cause; and by reason of its ordinary 
meaning, as toot which produces an effect, the development of theories 
easily passed into the realm of psychology. Instead of simply inquiring 
cur debet? they also, or even only, asked cur promisit? Instead of 
merely taking cause in a legal sense, as indicating the reason consid-
ered sufficient by the courts for enforcing an obligation, they went be-
yond the legal sphere into the psychological, inquiring why the obligor 
entered into the obligation; then, in place of a juristic fact, they had 
a psychological phenomenon, a motif: the attention was distracted from 
the material facts, such as the promise or prestation, to their influence 
upon the mind of the ohligor. Thereupon it became necessary to dis-
tinguish among different kinds of motifs so as to exclude all but the one 
which would correspond with the juristic cause; and then, finally, to 
give the doctrine a more practical and objective aspect, cause was de-
clared to be the "but que celui qui s'oblige se propose d'atteindre en 
contractant." 
This tendency in treatment was quite advanced before the final adop-
tion of the Code, as appears particularly from the discussions in the 
Conseil d'Etat on art. 1132. Here Bigot-Preameneu is reported as say-
ing: "Un citoyen reconnait devoir une somme sans enoncer la cause 
de sa dette; son obligation est valable parce que la declaration qu'il doit 
"Proces- l' erbaux du Conseil d' JIJtat , cont en.ant la discussion du Proyet du Code 
Oivil, IV, 168. 
(48) 
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fait presumer c1u'il a une cause; la volonte de s'engager a du en effe1 
etre appuyee sur un motif." Tronchet and Portalis, also editors, ex· 
pressed themselves to the same effect, though less definitely, while Treil· 
hard, of the Conseil d'1Hat, said: "Si je dis: je dois a Pierre, on sup· 
pose qu'une cause a dMcrrnine mon aveu." 41 
This view of cause was adopted by many writers and was gradually 
daborated until the simple statements of Domat and Pothier seem quite 
forgotten. Being an attempt to philosophize concerning the real nature 
of cause, it 1vas destined to lead to a clearer apprehension of the doctrine 
in its philosophical aspect; but for a time the writers seem to have over-
looked its strictly legal character, its relation to actual practice, and the 
importance of Domat's and Pothier's utterances and to have become 
confused in their own reasoning. They failecl to regard the different 
kinds of contracts, and what the cause was, objectively and materially, 
in each. They set out with the statement that "un engagement sans 
cause est llD acte de folie," thus beginning in the realm of psychology 
instead of jurisprudence, dealing with mental phenomena instead of 
juristic facts. 
'l'oullier considered cause to be "le motif qui determine a faire la 
promesse ;" but this being evidently too indefinite he proceeds to dis-
tinguish behveen the cause d6terminante and. principale, and the cause 
impulsive and accessoire, the former alone being recognized in law. 
Dcmante, following Toullicr, says: "La cause est ce qui dans un con-
trat determine une partie a s'obligor. Cette cause· determinante de 
!'obligation ne doit pas etre confondue avec la cause impulsive tlu contrat, 
:iutrement le motif qui porte a contracter." The distinction here made 
lietween the cause of the obligation and that of the contract, understood 
as the writer doubtless meant it, is perhaps correct; 42 but its abstruse-
ness has been such that his critics have perceived only his division of 
cause in to determinante and impulsive, treating both as applying to ob-
ligations. It is moreover doubtful whether any positive distinction can 
be drawn between the motive leading one to enter into the contract, and 
that causing one to bind himself.43 It seems at most an artificial one, 
r;erhaps convenient in discussion to gain lucidity, but useless aR a legal 
test. 
" Discussions du Code Civil d-Ons le Conseil d'Etat, II, 258. In the second 
edition ( 1808) of these Discussions, it is remarked, after examining a case, 
"On rnit qu'ici le mot cause signifie le motif, le but de !'obligation." III, 404. 
"Colmet de Santerre has adopted the reasoning of Demante, making it more 
perspicuous, however, warning against confusing the cause or ·motif of the con· 
tract with the cause of the obligation, and giving illustrations, viz.: "Pierre 
achete un cheval. Pourquoi l'achete-t-il? parce qu'il vent faire un vovage. Ce 
projet de voyage * * * est Ia cause ou le motif du ·contrat. Quand on 
cherche la cause de son obligation on trouve une autre cause. Pourquoi doit-il 
2,000 francs au vendeur? parce que celui-ci Jui a promis le cheval." Manuel 
elcmentaire de droit civil, II, 198. 
'" ''Ces termes sont synonymes, car les deux choses se confondent. En effet, 
le motif qui me det~rmine il. contracter me determine aussi il. m'obligcr; car en 
eoutractant· je m'oblige." Laborde, Theorie de la cause, 6. 
(49) 
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Demolombe, while following Demante, strove to make the principle 
more definite and practical, and thus introduced a view of cause, which, 
though still psychological, directed attention more specifically to the 
objective facts or circumstances-to the fait or promesse in the con-
tracts a titre onereux, and to the liberalite in those a titre gratuit. He 
defined cause as "le but . direct et immediat que la partie se propose 
d'atteindre en s'obligeant; c'est la cause :finale de l'obligation elle-
meme." 44 The distinction was then drawn between the cause finale 
and the cause occasionelle, the latter being the motif or cause of the con-
tract according to Demante. This view was widely adopted. Having 
more objectivity and definiteness than its predecessor, it was better 
adapted to form a legal test; in fact, the illustrations which were gen-
erally adduced coincided perfectly with the statements of Domat and 
Pothier, only the standpoint from which they were viewed revealing 
the psychological element.45 
Some writers, however, felt that in legal applications of the theory of 
cause the stress must be placed directly on the fait, the promesse, and 
the liberalite-not indirectly as being the purposes of the obligor; that 
in practice the immediate question was not, what did the obligor purpose 
to attain in binding himself, but what was the sufficient legal reason 
for holding him bound. The answer to the latter question, by thr very 
form of the question itself, was precisely limited to what the law re-
quired, it was specific and certain, while the answer to the former neces-
sitated distinctions between different kinds of causes. 
Laurent was foremost in attacking the doctrine of cause finale. He 
went back to Domat and to the utterance of Bigot-Preameneu in the 
Expose des Motifs, and rejected every notion of motif in the cause of 
an obligation so far as regards its juristic sense. In the contracts a 
titre onereux he says the cause "consiste dans le fait qui produit le con-
frat unilateral, OU Jans la promesfle reciproque qui constitue le. contrat 
synallagmatique ;" while in contracts a titre gratuit it is "la volonte de 
conferer un bienfait." 46 
Laurent, however, did more than bring the theory of cause back to its· 
legal basis; he went on to determine what the cause was with regard to 
the other conditions essentielles of art. 1108; instead of contenting 
himself with treating cause by itself, tacitly accepting its necessary 
presence as a distinct contractual element, he sought to discover its rela-
.. Demolombe, Traite des contrats, I, 330 . 
.. The statement in Stabel, lnstitutionen des franzosischen Oivilrechts, may 
be taken as representative: "Die causa einer Verbindlichkeit ist der unmittel· 
bare,. niichste Grund, aus welchcm sie einem Anderen versprochen wird. Dieser 
Urund Iiegt entweder darin, dass der Zusagende cine Gegenzusage oder eine 
Gegenleistung erhalten hat, oder darin, dass er dem Promissar einen unvergolt-
enen Vortheil zuwenden wollte. Jeder vernfinftige Mensch muss bei Uebernahme 
einer Verbindlichkeit entweder den einen oder den anderen Zweck gehabt haben." 
I . 327 . 
.. Laurent, Droit civil, XVI, 148; 161. 
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tions to the other clements. In ~o doing he indi<:atc<l the proper lim' 
of further study-one more fruitful to legal de\·elopment than the pre-
ceding; and though his reasoning must be modified, and his chief con .. 
clusion rejected, tlic imrortance of his purpose should be acknowledged. 
As a result of his analysis, Laurent asserted the requirement of a cause 
in a contract to be superfluous, that "dans les contrats a titre onereux 
la cause sc confond avec l'objet," and "dans la donation la cause se 
<:onfond * * * avec le consentement du donateur," so that ''le 
contrat existe ct est valable des que !es trois premieres conditions exigees 
par l'article ll08 existent: le consentement, la capa<:ite ct robjet."" 
But in arriving at this conclusion he seems to haYe oYcrlooked the close 
relation of the objet to the obligation. Art. llOS ~ays, ·'un objct cer-
tain qui forme la matiere de !'engagement," that is, of the obligation. 
Each obligation, in the nature of things as well as according to the Code, 
must haw a e:ame and an obj et: the latter is the prestation to which the 
obligor is bound, the former is the reason why he is bound. In bilateral 
contracts, then, it results that the objet of one obligation i~ the cause 
of the other, as Laurent well states: "La chose promise par l'acheteur 
est la cause de !'obligation du vendeur, et la cho:::e promise par le ven-
<leur est la cause de !'obligation de l'acheteur." 46 But a unilateral con-
tract, having only one obligation, contains only one cause and one ob jet; 
since, evidently, the objet of an obligation can not be the cause of the 
same obligation, we must seek elsewhere the cause of the obligation in 
a unilateral contract. As Laurent himself says, '·Dans !es contrats 
unilateraux, la cause de !'obligation du debiteur est la cho~e ou le fait 
qui est preste par l'autre partie et qui donne naissance au contrat; ""' 
but this cho~e or fait can not be the objet in the contract, at least ac-
cording to the Code, art. ll26 of which read~: "Tout contrat a pour 
obj et une chose qu'une partie s'obJige a donner, OU qu 'unc par tie s'oblige 
a faire OU a ne pas faire." 
Jn a promissory note we may assume the comentement, the capacite 
and an objct certain to be present, but, as lwtwcen the original parties at 
least, something more is required, namely, a valid reason for the obliga-
tion it contains, that i~ , a cause. And this is true whether the contract 
be a titre on6rcux or a titre gratuit. Though in the latter, as Laurent 
says, "la cause se confond * * * avec le consentement/' yet in-
quiry is proper into the reason for the obligor's "\·olonte de conferer un 
bienfait," which rcaspn, as Domat remarked, may consist in "un service 
rendu, OU quc]qu'autre merite du donataire, OU ]e seul pJaisir de faire du 
bien." WhateYcr it may be, it is distinguishable from the consentement, 
being that which explains this consentement, that which renders the ob-
ligation intelligible.50 
"Laurent, Drnit cii:1l, XVI, 149, 151. 
"Idem, XVI, 149. 
"Laurent, lJroit cfril, XVI, 150. 
"'In an earlier rnlume of his Droit Civil, Laurent argued that ·' la theorie de 
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The conclusion necessary from this analysis is that the cause in a 
contract has a distinct character of its own, and can not, as such, be 
transmuted into any other contractual element. Though the thing 
itself, which is clothed with th~ character of cause, may in fact coincide 
with some other element, as with the objet of the reciprocal obligation 
in all bilateral contracts, and with the consentement in those unilateral 
contracts a titre gratuit which rest upon a pure liberalite (as distin-
guished from those which are remuneratoire)' this coincidence is quite 
accidental; it occurs only by reason of the special circumstances in 
these particular contracts, and is foreign to the essential nature of cause. 
This view remains in harmony with Domat and Pothier: the nature 
of cause and its position in the law of obligations remain unaltered; 
there has merely been added an investigation showing its relations to 
the other contractual elements. 
The discussion has thus far been confined to the jurisprudence of 
France: The codes adopted during the century in other countries, and 
modeled upon the French Code Civil, have generally copied more or 
less literally articles 1108, 1131, 1132 and 1133.51 Portugal is a 
notable exception, having avoided all mention of cause. In some of 
these codes, particularly in those of Spain and the Spanish-American 
countries, a definition of cause is essayed. These definitions, however, 
merely reveal the variou:> aspects in which cause was viewed in France. 
Thus the C6digo Civil of Chile (art. 1467) adopts the extreme psycho-
logical view: "Se entiende por causa el motivo que induce al acto 6 
contrato ;" while that of Spain (art. 1274) follows the more legal one: 
"En los contratos onerosos se entiende por causa, para cada parte con-
tratante, la prestacion 6 promesa de una cosa 6 servicio, hecha por la 
otra partc; en los remuneratorios, el servicio 6 beneficio que se re-
muiiera; y en los lucrativos 6 de mera beneficencia, la liberalidad del 
bienhechor." The Code of Argentina exhibits more independent analy-
sis, but, though the phraseology is different, the idea remains the same; 
Lib. JI. , Sec. I, Part I, Tit. I, art. 5, reads: "No hay obligacion sin 
causa, es decir, sin que sea derivada de uno de los hechos, 6 de uno 
de los actos licitos 6 ilicitos, de las relationes de familia, 6 de las re-
laciones civiles." 
As adopted into the jurisprudonce of France, and derived thence into 
)a cause re~it son application aux donations" as follows: "Admettons que la 
cause dans Jes liMralites ne soit autre chose que la volonM de donner. Cette 
volonte est de conferer un' bienfait, par consequent un sentiment de bienfaisance, 
d'affection ou de gratitude. Le _fai.t B~ll;l de consenti~ ~e ~u~t done pas, ii faut 
que le consentement ait un motif JUn.d1que: c~ motif JUnd1que. est la. cause de 
la Jiberalite, la Joi se contente du sentiment qw nous porte i\ faire le b1en, paroe 
que c'est wi bon sentiment: voili\ la cause." XI, 658. 
11 Some, however, apparently failing to perceive the - relation of the cause to 
the obligation, have omitted the words "dans !'obligation" after "une cause 
licite" in art. 1108. See the Civil Code of Louisiana, art. 1779; of Netherlands, 
art. 1356; of Chile, art. 1445. 
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the laws of other states, cause reveals the final stage of generalization 
as regards contractual obligations, being required as a constituent in 
every contract known to the law of obligations. It is a true juristic 
element, neither reducible to nor interchangeable with other elements. 
Though not absolutely necessary, its disuse would be retrogression, 
involving a separate and more particular enumeration of requirements 
for each class of contracts, according as the thing forming objectively 
the cause differs in different kinds. Moreover, cause now exists inde-
pendently of its historic origin in the Roman law, requiring no refer-
ence beyond the time of Domat to explain its meaning and use. 
Turning now to Germany we find the development of the law there 
to have been such that causa has failed of adoption as a recognized 
essential element in every contract. The writings of Domat were 
viewed in their true light as belonging to the jurisprudence of France, 
and therefore never gained acceptance in Germany. Instead the Ger-
mans continued their adherence to the Corpus Juris, deriving thence 
their legal principles, and applying them quite as literally as was com-
patible with modern conditions. Especially was this true in the law of 
obligations, concerning which it has been said, "es herrscht bier fast 
durchweg das romische Recht." 52 
Inasmuch as the Roman contractual system, with its causa civilis 
distinguishing between contractus and pactum, had passed away, there 
arose during the Middle Ages the principle, already mentioned, of 
pacta sunt servanda. This has remained the leading principle in the 
German contract system to the present time, and consequently attention 
has been directed chiefly to the consensus; since this acts immediately 
in forming the contract, and is only mediately related to the obligation, 
while the exact reverse is true of causa, it has resulted that analysis 
has been rather of the contract than of the obligation; thus causa has 
appeared, when at all, in a subordinate role.63 Causa, as used in the 
innominate real contracts of Roman law, has never been raised into a 
universal contractual element, as in the jurisprudence of France, but 
has been restricted to its Roman application in connection with the 
condictiones given in the cases of grundlose Bereicherung. 
This is the condition of the theory of causa in the Biirgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, which went into effect January 1, 1900. The only positive 
recognition of the causa of Roman jurisprudence is in the title on 
Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung, the first section ( 812) of which reads: 
"Wer durch die Leistung eines Anderen oder in sonstiger Weise auf 
dessen Kosten etwas ohne rechtlichen Grund erlangt, ist ihm zur 
•
2 Holtzendorff, Encyclopiidie der Rechtswissenschaft, 397. 
03 Gerber (Privatrecht, 432) says: "Heutzutage wird der Grundsatz, dass das 
einfache V ersprechen nur in Verbindung mit seinem materiellen Rechtsgrunde 
Gel tung hat, meistentheils festgehalten ;" but this principle has never reached 
general acknowledgment as a specific rule to which the term causa, or any 
equivalent, has been applied. 
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HerauF1gabe verpfiichtet. Diese Verpfiichtung besteht auch dann, wenn 
der rechtliche Grund spiirer wegfiillt oder der mit einer Leistung nach 
dem Inhalte des Rechtsgeschiifts bezweckte Erfolg nicht eintritt." Here 
there appears no advance beyond the Roman doctrine embraced in the 
condictio sine causa, and causa is certainly not viewed as a universal 
essential for the formation or existence of a contractual obligation. 
There has been, however, in the Pandektenrecht of Germany a certain 
development of the theory of causa in connection with the law of obliga-
tions, but in the realm of philosophy rather than in that of law. It 
has had its origin, partly in the circumstame that a stipulatio or a 
cautio (Schuldschein) might either contain or omit mention of the pur-
pose for which given, and partly in the perceived psychological relation 
between the binding act of the obligor and the promise or performance 
of the obligee. This causa has been variously distinguished and denom-
inated according to the various aspects of the discussion. Dernburg, a 
current author, seems to take the simple legal view when he says: 
"Verpflichtungen ruft man in das Leben aus bestimmren wirthschaft-
1ichen Griinden;" 54 but elsewhere he states that "die Neueren verwenden 
causa vorzugsweise zur Bezeichnung des bestimmenden Zweckes der 
Vermogenszuwendungen: hierin folgen wir ihnen." 55 
This view, it will be perceived, embraces eausa both as the purpese 
to be attained in binding one's self, and as the motive leading to such 
binding act (the cause finale and the cause dererminante of French 
writers). Of these, the former is · the more popular. It is usually 
based on the philosophical observation that no one binds himself merely 
for the sake of doing so, but by reason r;f some causa.56 This causa has 
been variously called causa obligationis, materielle causa, Zweck,57 
Grund, Verpflichtungsgrund,58 and some have even adopted the extreme 
l'iew of making it an Absicht or Bestimmungsgrund.59 
A peculiarity of this doctrinal development is that the references to 
the Corpus Juris are chiefly to the employment of causa as a preposition, 
e.g. donandi causa, solvendi causa, credendi causa, uses in which it may 
be replaced by gratia.60 
It appears that this treatment of cau10a has been in the sphere of con-
tractual obligations, and thus far it coincides with the treatment by 
Domat and Pothier; moreover, so far as regards the object forming the 
.. Dern burg, Pandekten ( 5. ed.), II, §22. 
'"Idem, I, §95 . 
.. "Man verspricht z. B. nicht 1000 M., lediglich, um sie zu versprechen, son· 
dern zu einem gewissen Zweck." Wachter, Pandekten, 352. 
"Baron, Pandekten, §214. 
08 Windscheid, Pandekten, II, §318. 
'" Arndts, Pandekten, §463. 
eo Lotmar, Ueber Oausa im romischen Recht, 33. 
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physical basis of the causa, this, too, coincides with the statements of these 
French jurists. But there is nevertheless a most radical difference from 
a legal point of view; it is the same we have traced in the writings on 
the French Code Civil, viz.: the distinction between viewing causa as 
the reason why a person binds himself, and taking it as the reason why 
the law · holds him bound. Philosophically there may be no objection 
to the reasoning of these authors of Pandekten regarding Zweck, but law 
ia practical, objective and empirical, and theories, to become firmly in-
troduced into a living system of jurisprudence, must conform to legal 
standards. The new German code has rejected the causa of the Pandek-
tenrechf because not sufficiently juridical, and has supplied the place of a 
universal principle of causa in contracual obligations by its more par-
ticular constituents. 
As we glance back, in closing, over the evolution of causa in the con-
tractual obligations of the Civil law, we are impressed with the tremen-
dous reach of its development: two thousand years ago it was unrecog-
nized and unknown; to-day it represents an element of the highest legal 
refinement, absolutely essential to the existence of a contract among 
nearly all peoples speaking languages of Latin origin. It also illustrates 
most perfectly the manner in which juristic theories and social condi-
tiqns react upon each other in the development of legal principles and 
institutions, how gradual and tentative this development is, and how 
adjustable t-0 the needs of civilization. 
(56) 
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